The institution supports cooperating with Argentina
The second report presented to the Navy first recognized Tabaré cooperation with the Armada Argentina and the Argentine arrest as the leader montonero Oscar de Gregorio. Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared say the information is incomplete and biased Marina.
After numerous complaints from civil society, yesterday the organization Mothers and Relatives of the Disappeared Uruguayan (Mfudd) released the second report that the Navy gave President Vázquez information on human rights violations during the dictatorship. The decision came after the Navy chief, Vice Admiral Tabaré Daners, reaffirmed in an act that the weapon was not responsible for the disappearances. The first report acknowledges the cooperation with the Armada Argentina and Uruguay Argentine detention which were then delivered to our country. In particular, detained the leader admits montonero Oscar de Gregorio.
"It is remarkable that after so many years that the military denied the existence of files related to the time of the dictatorship, now eludes them as normal. This deserves us a question: how do we know if the opening of the archives is not partial and biased? " This doubt, that communicates Mfudd President, is the main question that underlay other military reports and the excavations that started from them and still have not worked if-gnificativos. The Navy recognizes that "there was coordination and exchange of information between the Fusna (Naval Fusiliers) and the ESMA (Escuela Superior de Mecanica de la Armada), and between agencies Prefecture of both countries." Also, for the first time, the institution admits arrested in the Uruguayan territory montonero leader Oscar de Gregorio and have then delivered to the Navy of Argentina.
The report, however, did not meet the expectations it created. The conclusions stressed that "there is no evidence of transfers of Uruguayan citizens detained in Argentina to units of the Navy or arrested by the Uruguayan Navy to Buenos Aires. "recognizes that the weapon only had information from citizens detained in the neighboring country by local security forces and in the case of De Gregorio and other Argentine unidentified were delivered. The Mfudd states that, although limited, that finding "evidence of their participation in enforced disappearances and belies the assertion that there were no deaths or disappearances in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Navy."
Among other "shortcomings" of the report which acknowledges the family organization, emphasizes that, although the institution acknowledges that they have copies of statements of a group of Uruguayans detained in Argentina, not included in the letter submitted to President Tabare, which further increases their hypothesis of incomplete and biased information. The report also details the involvement of this weapon in the operations of the "Joint Forces." Uruguayan Navy knew that the bulk of the detainees were held in two Uruguayan clandestine centers, Pozos de Quilmes and Banfield, contradicting reports from former detainees and human rights organizations from both countries can not confirm that marine Uruguayans have been physically these detention centers. ***
The second report of the Navy
(This report presents what they have found regarding the fate of Uruguayans who disappeared in Argentina from what is stated in the Final Report of the Commission for Peace and published it in the book "at all."
Searching for information was directed towards the end of 1977, the arrest of an Argentine citizen belonging to the Movement Montoneros, which triggered the fall of militants Unifying Action Groups and others, and at the same time, deepened operational relationships between the minds of the Armed Rio de la Plata.
The information gathered is derived from data file, press releases, publications issued by organizations Defence of Human Rights, research in areas of Starfleet Command, National Naval Prefecture and the General Staff and interviews with senior and junior of the day in question.
Summary Summary:
After analyzing the information collected will be reached the following conclusions:
1. There was coordination and exchange of information between the ESMA FUSNA and agencies and between the two countries Prefecture, with no records or testimony that allow it links with other bodies of Argentina.
2. The Oscar DE GREGORIO Argentine citizen was arrested by members of the Navy and delivered to the Navy Argentina after government coordination.
3. The arrests of marriage MICHELENA Gouveia and Fernando MARTINEZ SANTORO, took place in Buenos Aires in mid-1977, have been carried out by an Argentine police agency identified as "PP B III." CORCHS missing citizens, D'ELIA, Borelli, Moyano and Nephew, arrested in late December of that year in Argentina, possibly. Is not excluded that the remaining detainees in that month Uruguayans have been following the same process.
4. Probably effective police agency referred to in the preceding paragraph have been killed Luis Fernando MARTINEZ SANTORO at an early date and after August 30, 1977.
5. The arrests of the members of the "Regional GAU Buenos Aires, who were under surveillance since the fall of MICHELENA, DE MARTINEZ SANTORO GOUVEIA and possibly precipitated from the capture in Uruguay DE GREGORIO and Montonero Cell Movement and fall of the GAU in Montevideo.
6. No evidence of transfer of Uruguayan citizens detained in Argentina Navy Units or arrested by the Uruguayan Navy to Buenos Aires.
7. Navy officials interviewed said they had been in the Clandestine Detention Centers known as "Wells Quilmes and Banfield," places of detention of detainees in December Uruguayan 1977, according to the final report of the Commission for Peace.
8. During 1978 a citizen national of Argentina stopped by our prefecture was returned to his like Argentina, with no record of the identification.
9. The use of physical constraints in the FUSNA as a method of interrogation was not systematic. These practices are carried out almost exclusively, from the mid 70's and explicitly been resisted and front for almost the entire officer corps of the unit.
10. As a result of what was stated in the previous section, both the records consulted and made personal inquiries, such as information gathered from various media and organizations can express that there were no deaths or disappearances in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Navy.
Annexes:
- 1. Description and evaluation of sources of information used.
- 2. Organization and operation of the Marine Corps and in particular the 2nd. His staff section (Intelligence, S-2).
- 3. Links between the Navy and the Armada Argentina.
- 4. Arrest and surrender of the Argentine citizen
Oscar DE GREGORIO - 5. Chronological list of arrests made in late 1977 in Uruguay and Argentina. ANNEX 1
- Sources of Information Data File Navy gather information at the time not being registered at all complete, probably due to errors, omissions and lack of continuity in the collection of information, which was discontinued years ago.
press information processed is obviously not conclusive or know the original sources of information in most cases. Were analyzed, among others, an interview with two former detainees FUSNA recounting his stay in the Marine Corps staff and prisoners, detailing their activities within the S-2 and the operation of this in relation to operations in late 1977. A analyzed the most important pieces is a document apparently from the distribution found in Argentina, in which describes an operation called "Operation Countersubversion GAU.
publications issued by organizations defending human rights constitute the largest data base on this, but although the investigations are really serious and deep, are not conclusive in most cases due to circumstances entangled investigate the facts.
were interviewed officers and ratings who served in units that operated in the period, all respondents agreed to participate. The nature of information collected, en cuanto a su veracidad y especificidad, ha dependido del grado de colaboración voluntaria de los actores involucrados.
ANEXO 2 - La organización del FUSNA y su (S-2) La Unidad operativa de la Armada que actuó principalmente en la lucha contra la guerrilla fue el Cuerpo de Fusileros Navales (FUSNA). Unidad ésta que se organizó a pleno, luego de la toma del Centro de Instrucciones de la Armada por parte del MLN Tupamaros en el año 1970. Orgánicamente estaba constituido por : Comando, Estado Mayor y 3 Brigadas de Infantes. Su principal tarea era la custodia de las instalaciones navales terrestres, operaciones de seguridad y la desarticulación del aparato guerrillero.
El S-2 o Sección Intelligence acted seeking information on subversive movement operating underground. In situations of lesser urgency were exploited mostly open source or conducting surveillance and monitoring operations.
During the early years of the 70 main source of information was the interrogations and the use of informants. As they were arresting members of the various guerrilla organizations, especially MLN, they were interrogated, their information was processed by the analyst at S-2 who integrated and compared with other information, disseminated through the Operations Coordinating Body insurgency (OCOA) and generates new requisitions and detention operations.
the mid 70's the low FUSNA the profile of the same counterinsurgency operations focusing primarily on the S-2.
subdivision operation of the guerrilla groups increased the need for intelligence to be decisive in increasing the exchange of information between the various intelligence agencies and the use of physical pressure against the rush to get information. Required information within 24 hours in order not to allow "emergency measures" to put to flight the rest of the organization.
The operating procedure was characterized by a high level partitioning between the S-2 and the rest of the Unit. Line staff, should carry out an operation and have detained at S-2 delivered immediately. Only had contact with them while serving Carcelaje Guard, which consisted of physical custody, interior and exterior of celdario, or during transportation to court, hospital, release, delivery to the prison of freedom, etc.
The organic stated that the next higher step S-2 was the Commander of the Unit and this in turn reported directly to the Commander in Chief.
Since 1981, intelligence operations cease completely FUSNA among other things when it became apparent discrepancies in the operation of S-2 area during the years 1977 and 1978.
received in 1980 including the inspection by the International Red Cross celdario and his report states: "The conditions of detention of FUSNA look as good today as they were previously hard. Currently, detainees enjoy a treatment human, individual and liberal, allowing them to still consider themselves human beings and responsible. ICRC delegates do not understand why it is not possible to extend these facilities to other places of detention in the country.
The greatest discrepancy was in operation the "computer". This was a group of prisoners who agreed to collaborate in return for receiving better treatment prison, and the promise of reducing the penalty to comply and not be transferred to criminal or Punta Freedom Rail. The collaboration consisted of information, press reviews, guidance on interrogations and information processing.
is noteworthy that the FUSNA operated since its inception while maintaining strict operational codes, established and supervised personally by its first commander, and as a result, at times, their corporate officers took positions that collided with the operational guidelines of some commanders Unit later.
ANNEX 3 - Links to the ESMA's activities clandestinely reorganization of the various movements were directed to work in union and student areas, to maintain contact with organizations in other countries and activists living outside their own borders, and try to regroup in front of common struggle against the government that prevailed in Uruguay. Uruguayan
militants operating in Argentina, many of them required by national authorities, trying to finance the activities of the organization to which they belonged, propaganda and join forces.
Argentine counterinsurgency forces focussing on two organizations, Montoneros and ERP, and national organizations or other countries associated with them.
The very modus operandi of the guerrilla organizations led insurgency coordination between the navies of both countries.
In what has to do with the information area, the links start in 1974 by the Armada Argentina would like to receive information and experience how it was operating against the guerrillas, a phenomenon that began to materialize in that country.
These contacts are maintained through visits by the Argentines in the mid 70's, in turn, the Chief Intelligence FUSNA Navy units visited Argentina, including the ESMA, in that period.
in 1977 to relieve the Commander in Chief, the relationship grew, especially in the personal relationship between the Commanders in Chief of both armed, and also with the safety requirements of the World Cup to be held in Argentina in the following year taking into account that there was information indicating that the Movement Montonero planned to use that time to strike a blow in that country.
At the same time, the Navy had contacts with other intelligence agencies of our country, some of whom also had links with the ESMA and other Operations Centers.
Coordination and exchange of information with the Coast Guard Argentina was done mostly between the Research Division of the National Naval Prefecture and the Information Service of the Coast Guard Argentina (DIPRE IPPS)
In short, relations between the navies of Uruguay and Argentina during the investigation period are evidenced by the following facts:
- trips made by the Heads of the S-2 to Buenos Aires
- Travel to Montevideo Argentine officers arrested accompanied by staff belonging to the Movement Montoneros
- Presence FUSNA custody of the Commander in Chief of the Navy of Argentina, who was attending Punta del Este frequently
- Stay in FUSNA of vehicles registered in Argentina for custody previously mentioned which were later donated to the Unit
- Concurrency immediately a team of 2 officers from Argentina and a collaborator with the capture of the leader montonero Oscar DE GREGORIO
- Let the leader ESMA montonero above
- Delivery of an Argentine citizen detained by PNN and sent to the Prefecture Argentina, presumably through the Vapor de la Carrera.
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